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IN DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIAN ACADEMIC UNIONISM 
Grahame McCulloch 
Union of Australian College Academics 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper does not aspire to be an objective 
account of academic unionism. It is written from 
my perspective as a committed union activist, and 
comes at a time when there is a real prospect of a 
substantial erosion of the role and authority of 
Australia's academic unions. I refer, of course, to 
the well publicised plans of Professor David 
Penington (Vice-Chancellor of the University of 
Melbourne and immediate Past President of the 
Australian Higher Education Industrial 
Association (AHEIA), the national university 
employers' body) and Dr David Kemp 
(Liberal/National Party Shadow Federal 
Education Minister). Professor Penington and Dr 
Kemp have developed a model of academic 
industrial relations in which working conditions 
would be radically deregulated, and in which 
unions would be given only a limited role. They 
see unionism as responsible for the debasement of 
collegial life in our universities, and see Statel 
regulation of academic working conditions as an 
erosion of university autonomy. State intrusion, 
the argument goes, has imposed a rigid and 
uniform labour code and has served academics 
badly. 
This paper is something of a defence against these 
charges. Its bulk consists of some observations 
about the emergence of mass higher education in 
the last 30 years, and the change this has 
engendered in the rela tionships between 
universities, their academic staff and the State. 
The account underlines that the emergence of 
academic unionism is a response to, rather than a 
cause of, the erosion of the traditional 'liberal' 
conception of higher education, and the rise of the 
managerial ethos in Australian academe. I 
suggest that this has been an international 
phenomenon and that senior leaders of higher 
education have been quite prepared to support 
selective State intervention when it suits their 
managerial purpose. 
In the latter part of the paper I briefly survey the 
recent achievements of Australian academic 
unions and conclude that the proposals of Dr 
Kemp and Professor Penington should not be 
supported. 
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Three disclaimers are necessary. First, the general 
thesis set out is based primarily on my own 
experiences of the last 15 years and is not 
intended to be a scholarly account. For those with 
an intellectual interest in academic unionism I 
have, however, provided appropriate notes and 
references. Second, although I have introduced a 
comparative element into the discussion, my 
treatment of overseas developments is really only 
the beginning of what needs to be a more detailed 
investigation. Finally, the paper does not look at 
the cultural dimensions of academic labour's 
evolution. This is obviously an important issue as 
it bears directly on the relationship between 
academic life, civil society and the State which in 
turn helps to define the self-consciousness of 
academic labour. But I will leave that question to 
the sociologists and philosophers! 
FROM AN ELITE TO A MASS SYSTEM OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
A Note on International Developments 
Much of the public comment generated by the 
establishment of Australia's Unified National 
System of Higher Education (UNS) and the 
accompanying (and not always unworthy) 
demonization of former Federal Education 
Minister John Dawkins pays too little attention to 
the origins of today'S Australian higher education 
sector. The shape of the system owes as much to 
State intervention by successive Governments in 
the 1950s, 1990s and 1990s as it does to John 
Dawkins and the State intervention of the late 
1980s. Moreover, there are parallels between the 
evolution of Australian universities and those of 
Western Europe and North America. 
The 30 year period immediately following the 
Second World War was marked throughout the 
Western World by enormous industrial and 
economic reconstruction and growth, by rising 
populations and by rising standards of living. 
Amidst this economic boom higher education 
was profoundly transformed by the twin 
pressures of rising social demand for access to 
universities, and by the seemingly insatiable 
demand of industry and external labour markets 
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fOf ever increasing numbers of specialists and 
technicians. 
There was an explosion in student numbers and 
an enormous growth in the level of financial 
support for higher education throughout Western 
Europe and North America. A substantial 
increase in the cost of higher education arose not 
only from quantitative growth but also from 
changes in the way in which higher education 
was delivered. Larger institutions emerged, there 
was a proliferation of specialist discipline and 
institution types, and capital and equipment 
outlays were increased enormously to maintain 
and extend research and teaching infrastructure 
in an undifferentiated fashion across most 
disciplines areas. This shift to a higher cost 
structure impinged on both public and private 
higher education institutions and remains a 
common feature of higher education systems in 
the developed world today. 
The long boom in higher education was 
underpinned, even in the most free-market 
systems of the US and Japan, by extensive State 
intervention in the form of public grants and 
subsidies and by an increasing State authority 
over planning. In Western Europe the character 
of State intervention was overtly based on the 
direct centralised development of a fully public 
system, whilst in the US decentralised State 
authority performed the dual purpose of 
providing expanded public facilities and 
intervening to rescue the mass private higher 
education sector which was on the verge of 
collapse following market failure in the 1960s 
(Geiger, R. 1986 and Fulton, O. et al., 1982). 
With the growth of higher education and the rise 
of State intervention came substantial changes to 
the traditional conception of the independent 
rights of universities. An ILO Report described 
the change in this way: 
... in the postwar period nearly all coulltries have 
trallsformed their institutiolls of higher 
educatioll from autollomous or semi-
autollomous ellterprises, with cOllsiderable 
freedom of fillaltcialmallagemellt alld cOlltrol of 
access, to members of a system, at least partly 
ce1ltrally plan lied and fillallced alld bearillg a 
very differellt relationships to the State (and to 
each other) from that of the university ideal of 
previous cellturies. This trallsformatioll has, of 
course, taken place to different extellts alld with 
differe1lt degrees of deliberateness, in different 
coulltries ... but there are IlO coulltries for whom 
the cOllcept of academic freedom still gives 
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ulliversities all unqualified right to determine 
either the size of their illtakes or their sources 
and level of finance 
(Fulton, 1982, p. 5). 
The same report describes the shift from 'elite' to 
'mass' higher education and the structural change 
it produced: 
When more than a small proportion of the 
[population] has access to the higher educatioll 
syste1ll its institutions inevitably challge 
character ill mallY different ways. These 
changes generally illclude both the origins alld 
destinations of graduates, the amoullt of 
resources expended on teaching and hence the 
kind and quality of instruction and, indeed, the 
structure of higher education... Sooner or later, 
it becomes impossible to cOlltinue to expalld 
universities of the 'elite' type, and new 
illstitutions develop ... the pressures of growth 
and differentiation seem to lead to three 
develop11te1tts: an expansion of nOIl-university 
higher education; later, a telldency to merge 
ulliversity alld nOIHlIliversity forms into more 
flexible, comprehensive institutions and an 
ill creased emphasis Oil part-time higher 
educatioll 
(Fulton, 1982, p. 11). 
Although these developments threatened the 
traditional conception of universities in many 
ways - by blurring the traditional distinction 
between 'liberal' education and vocational 
education, by merging previously distinct 
professional cultures, by eroding university 
independence from the State and by allowing 
economic forces to shape curricula and the 
pattern of provision - they were in general 
supported by the leaders of higher education 
institutions throughout Western Europe and 
North America. In an environment of ever 
expanding resources concerns about the pure 
ideals of the Academy being diluted were 
outweighed by the tangible benefits of growth . 
The same was true for the academic staff. The 
long boom was characterised by excess demand 
for qualified staff with academics consequently 
being guaranteed substantially rising standards 
of living and almost unlimited access to 
promotion and to research funds. In the US the 
demand for available faculty members actually 
outpaced the number of trained professionals 
during the 1950s and 1960s. The demand for 
faculty members above simple replacement needs 
stood at 27,500 per year by the late 1960s (Shaw, 
1985, p. 11). US academic salaries increased 
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sharply by 75% in real terms between 1959 a~d 
1969 (Drescher and Polishook, 1985), whIle 
between 1967 and 1973 academic salaries 
increased in real terms by 16% in the UK and 29% 
in NZ (Marginson, 1989, p. 20). 
A Note on Australian Developments 
The trends in Western Europe and North America 
were also reflected in Australia during the post-
Second World War period, although arguably 
with some lag. Higher education expanded 
dramatically throughout the late 1950s, 1960s and 
the early 1970s with the student population more 
than trebling and the proportion .of gross 
domestic product allocated to educahon more 
than doubling (Senate, 1982, p. 43). 
Accompanying this spectacular growth were 
increased State intervention, moves towards 
central planning and the establishment and 
subsequent consolidation of whole new sectors of 
the system. The recommendations of the Murray 
Report in 1957 laid the basis for the establishment 
of the Australian Universities Commission (AUC) 
by the Menzies Government in 1959, and for the 
subsequent provision of direct triennial grants ~o 
universities by the Commonwealth. The Martlll 
Report of 1964, following a three year review, was 
the foundation for the establishment of the 
Commonwealth Advisory Committee on 
Advanced Education which subsequently became 
the Advanced Education Commission (AEC) 
(Birch and Smart, 1977 and Harman and Smart, 
1982). The provision of direct grants to the States 
for advanced education in 1965, and the 
subsequent rapid growth of the sector, parallelled 
the development of non-university higher 
education provision in Western Europe and North 
America. The Martin Report also unsuccessfully 
recommended the establishment of a unitary 
national planning body for universities. and 
colleges - it was to be another 13. years unhl !he 
Fraser Government finally consohdated plannmg 
for both sectors under the umbrella of the Tertiary 
Education Commission (TEC), and to be a further 
12 years before the move ~owards comprehensive 
institutions occurred WIth the release of the 
Dawkins'1988 White Paper. This shift was already 
apparent in much of Europe and the US in the 
mid-to-Iate 1970s. Australia reflects the longevity 
of its Anglophile roots in this respect. Alon~ with 
the UK, Australia maintained a rigid bmary 
divide between advanced education and 
universities until the late 1980s although there 
was nonetheless considerable merger activity in 
the UKin the early 1980s (Meek, 1988, pp. 159-70). 
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The most dramatic expression of centralisation 
and State intervention in Australia was the 
assumption in 1973 ?f fu~l Common,:"ealth 
responsibility for fundmg hl~her educahon - a 
decision which fatally undermmed the long term 
planning role of State Go~e.r~ents and gave the 
national Government deCISIve mfluence. 
Although, like their overseas counterparts, some 
Australian university and college leaders and 
academic staff had reservations about the extent 
of State intervention and the scale of expansion -
narrow ins trumenta lis m, declining academic 
standards, concern about autonomy and so on -
they on the whole supported the proc~ss and 
reaped substantial immediat~ materIal and 
academic rewards (WheelWrIght, 1965 and 
Bessant, 1982, pp. 26-33). As early as 1952 in a 
pamphlet titled A Crisis ill the Finance alld 
Development of Australian Uni~ersities the 
Australian Vice-Chancellors CommIttee (AVCC) 
gave support to national rather than regional 
planning of universities, and to a much expanded 
Commonwealth funding role (Birch and Smart, 
1977, pp. 124-5). Throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 
early 1970s compromises were reached which 
enabled the State to use universities and colleges 
to achieve its social and economic objectives 
while universities were able to rely on the State as 
a benevolent patron which could be trusted to 
defend the traditional liberal and scholarly 
foundations of higher education. Planning 
authorities within the State apparatus - the 
various Commissions and later the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission 
(CTEC) - were largely run and organised by 
senior university leaders and were able to 
function without interference from other 
Government agencies. The State relied on 
politically astute Vice-Chancellors to ~esp?nd to 
Government priorities without overt dIrection. In 
turn this 'arm's length' relationship provided the 
Vice-Chancellors with privileged access to 
decision-makers within the State apparatus. 
The pace of Australian expansi~:m in the 196~s .and 
1970s brought with it the famihar characterIsti~ of 
excess demand for academic labour, accompamed 
by rising academic. ~alaries and ~ubstantial 
promotion opportumtIes for academIC staff. In 
the decade from 1966-1975 the average salary of 
an Australian senior lecturer increased by 23.7% 
in real terms (Marginson, 1989, p. 16), and the 
prospects for appointment and promotion were 
so good in the 1960s and early 1970s that 
Professor Geoffrey Harcourt was later to say: 
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... because of the expansion ill the 1960s, ... 
people of my age for example, 'Who 'Were lu~ky 
enough to be bom at the he.ig.'lt of th~ depress 1011 
and then just come to frultlOll III tllne to teach 
the baby boo Ill, have had roses, roses all the 'Way 
(Senate, 1982, p. 43). 
THE END OF THE BOOM 
competing Interests in a New System 
The benefits of the long boom in higher education 
d the relative comfort it engendered for those an . t . 
working in the system masked emergmg enslO~s 
within and between universities, their academIC 
staff and the State. 
The expansion had prod'7ced.perm~nent internal 
changes to higher education, mcludmg: 
• A more direct connection between institutions 
and business/industry, including the 
expansion of external ~epresenta.tion on~ and 
involvement in, the declslOn-makmg bodIes of 
universi ties. 
• An expansion of internal democracy with 
greater levels of participatory go~ernan~e 
inside universities and colleges - thIS was m 
large measure a response t? the intelle~tual 
and political discontent whIch swept hIgher 
education in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
• An increase in the non-research effort of 
universities focussed primarily on 
undergraduate teaching arising from the 
explosion in social demand. 
• Expansion of vocationa.l/profes~ional 
education and a consequent mcrease m ~h~ 
numbers of academic staff without an a prIOrI 
commitment to the liberal ideal of the 
university. 
• An increase in the internal complexity of 
institutions and an associated growth in the 
internal central bureaucracy based on a layer 
of professional managers, administrative 
officers and the like. 
• Academic staff acquired 'mass' labour 
functions, and were required to respond to an 
increasingly differentiated clientele as a result 
of expanded undergraduate enrolm~~ts and 
an increased emphasis on proVISIOn of 
opportunities for the socially disadvantaged. 
Academics had been transformed from 
autonomous professionals into white collar 
wage and salary earners, although many were 
not yet conscious of this. 
Vol. 17, No. 2,1992 
Allstraliml JOllmal ofTeac/ler Edllcation 
Universities had become big businesses within 
themselves. This involved a significant erosion of 
both the conservative vision of universities 
(Newman's Idea and the 'community of schol~rs') 
and the radical vision of universities as pOSSIble 
agents of revoluti~mar):' c~a~ge throug~ the 
transmission of anh-capltahst Ideas. PartIcular 
institutions might still pursue these visions, and 
within institutions particular d~partments or 
disciplines might uphold these perspectives: But 
the higher education system as ~ whole, m ~ll 
developed countries, had acqUlr~d (and .stlll 
retains) broader economic and SOCIal functlOns 
based on more utilitarian imperatives. The end of 
the boom brought this fact into sharp relief. 
The world-wide downturn of capitalism in the 
mid 1970s was accompanied by a sharp rise in 
inflation throughout the developed world, ~nd a 
universal fiscal crisis of the State. The cessatIon of 
economic growth and burgeoning budget deficits 
forced Governments of all political persuasions to 
sharply reduce public expenditure. For higher 
education systems throughout Europe, Nor!h 
America and Australia this meant a rapId 
deterioration of their financial position and, for 
the first time, intensive external and internal 
competition for funds. !he problem was 
compounded by demographIC factors. The po~t­
war baby-boom had dissipated and SOCIal 
demand for higher education levelled off. 
Declining enrolments coincided with the financial 
squeeze. 
This sparked tension within and ?~tween 
institutions and their staff as competitIOn for 
access to scarce resources intensified. Consensus 
decision-making and a sense of common purpose 
began to break down as institutions s.ought to 







'excellence' or universal access 
liberal arts or science/professions 
concentrated or generalised research funding 
teaching and research effort 
differentiation or comprehensivity in 
distributing funding reducti<?ns within 
individual universities and faculties. 
(Lourens, 1990, pp. 218-231) 
The attempted resolution of these contradictions 
transformed the most senior academics from 
scholarly leaders with adn:inistr~tiv~ functions 
into academic managers WIth obhgatIons to the 
corporate objectives of institutional central 
bureaucracy, as well as to a broad external 
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constituency encompassing the business sector 
and representatives of the State. From this 
process merged the explicit shift to concern with, 
and the implementation of policy around the 
concepts of productivity, efficiency and 
accountability. These had become central to the 
language of internal and external debate about 
universities around the world by the mid 1980s. 
The academic labour market moved rapidly from 
excess demand to excess supply with consequent 
reductions in real academic salaries, intense 
competition for new appointments and the 
drying-up of promotion opportunities for young 
and enthusiastic academics. Like the earlier 
parallels of the period of growth there are some 
similarities between Australia, Western Europe 
and the US. 
US academic salaries fell 20.5% between 1971 and 
1982, compared to a drop of only 4.3% for 
comparable occupations. Faculty salaries did not 
creep ahead of inflation until 1983 and this 
advance was due not to increases in salaries, but 
rather to a sharp decline in the inflation rate 
(Shaw, 1985, p.10). A US commentator describes 
the tale of an ageing academic staff structure and 
its consequences for promotion in the early 1980s 
climate of no growth: 
... changes in faclllty demography left America's 
colleges and universities with a large proportion 
of faculty members, tmured and in their middle 
forties and fifties, who will not retire for another 
15 or 20 years ... these demographic conditions, 
coupled with retrenchments, have meant a sharp 
decrease in the 1ll1mber of available jobs for the 
new PhD and few, if any, promotional 
opportunities for young faculty. The crunch is 
felt disproportionately by women and minority 
faculty who did IlOt begin to enter the system in 
significant numbers until the late 1970s 
(Shaw, 1985, p. 11). 
In the UK the onset of stagnation saw real 
academic salaries fall by 16.3% between 1973 and 
1985 (Marginson, 1989, p. 20). The number of full 
time teaching and research staff in British 
universities fell from 43,017 in 1980-81 to 41,994 in 
1982-83 while 1,134 full-time academic posts were 
lost in the polytechnic sector over the same 
period. This, combined with an academic 'age 
bulge', limited access to promotion, made the 
appointment of young full-time tenured staff 
increasingly difficult, and saw a significant rise in 
the use of part-time academic staff (Farnham, 
1985). 
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Australian academic salaries also declined during 
this period. Between 1973 and 1985 real wages for 
a senior lecturer fell by 15.3% (Marginson, 1988, p. 
11), a trend which was accompanied by riSing 
undergraduate teaching loads and declining 
relative staff numbers. In 1979 there were 90 
academic staff per thousand students. By 1983 
there were only 82 academic staff per thousand 
students (McCulloch et al., 1984 p. 13). Low 
academic staff separation rates and the fact that 
over 70% of academic staff were under the age of 
45 in 1980 meant that new appointment and 
promotion opportunities dried up. 
The Rise of Managerialism 
A new managerialism asserted itself vigorously in 
dealing with the labour market and policy 
dilemmas generated by the end of higher 
education's long boom. University managers and 
notionally independent buffer bodies within the 
State apparatus were increasingly active in 
proposing adjustment mechanisms which 
affected the vital economic and intellectual 
interests of academic staff. These included 
successful and unsuccessful attempts to reduce 
the incidence of tenure, to establish retrenchment 
and redundancy provisions, to create larger 
numbers of junior teaching only positions and to 
increase workloads. 
Such an agenda was incompatible with the 
collegial governance structure of universities 
which had been strengthened by the earlier 
period of substantial growth and expansion. 
Hence at the end of the long boom institutional 
management and the State moved to dilute 
democratic processes inside universities and 
colleges and to rely instead on strategic planning 
and management by objectives as decision-
making techniques. 
In the US this change has been described as: 
... an institutional drift from faculty to 
centralised control [where] ... administrators 
have adopted management strategies which 
reduce costs by increasing administrative 
control. 'Laissez1aire campus administration', 
the administrative model most compatible with 
the academic inyth, has been replaced by 
[strategies] that rely on control, planning, 
evaluation and reallocation to promote 
institutional strength within financial 
constraints. This centralised control undercuts 
the autonomy, collegia/ity and shared 
govemance that is central to the myth of 
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academe ... FacuIty senates, which increased in 
number and ill promillellce duri/lg the late 
1960s and 1970s, have proved llllable to either 
reassert a faCility role in administrative decision-
making or recreate a shared collegial decision-
making st1'llcture. Several major studies of 
facuIty senates have shown that in most cases 
the facuIty senate role in govemance is 
supeljicial, insignificant, and advisory only. 
Even where faculty senates do exercise 
authority, that authority does IlOt extend to 
hiring, firillg, promotion, and tenure 
(Shaw, 1985, p. 12). 
In Britain the Jarret report, relying heavily on 
commissioned studies by the UK Committee of 
Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP), 
recommended in late 1985 major changes to the 
internal structures of institutions including the 
development of strategic plans, the establishment 
of university planning and resource committees 
of 'strictly limited size', the appointment of heads 
of department by council only on the 
recommendation of the Vice-Chancellor, the 
categorisation of the Vice-Chancellor as chief 
executive and manager and a reduction in the 
size, frequency and number of committees. These 
changes involved shifts in the distribution of 
authority within institutions - a process described 
by a British commentator in the following way: 
... institutional emphasis on orgallisational 
efficiency and managerial control [affected] 
conditions of service, class contact hours and 
staff workloads ... with implications for both 
management and academic staff. It affects the 
role of heads of departments, deans of facuIties 
and other senior institutional office holders such 
as IlIliversity vice-cllallcellors. They become 
increasingly managers of institutional resources, 
including academic staff rather thall academic 
leaders, general admillistrators and institutiOlwl 
spokespeople 
(Farnham, 1985, p. 58). 
These managerial preoccupations were echoed in 
Australia by the recommendations of the 1988 
White Paper which included proposed reductions 
in the size of governing bodies, calls for what it 
described as 'strong managerial' modes of 
operation and the requirement for institutions to 
establish educational profiles (Dawkins, 1988, p. 
103). What is commonly overlooked in much of 
the response to these aspects of Dawkins' 
proposals is that in substance similar 
recommendations emerged earlier in 1985 from 
the allegedly more independent CTEC. In its 
Review of Efficiency and Effectiveness CTEC 
Vol. 17, No. 2,1992 
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recommended the abolition of elected Deans and 
Heads of School and an increased emphasis on 
selection of senior academics using management 
criteria. It also commented favourably on 
majority external representation on university 
councils and recommended punitive changes to 
academic conditions of employment including 
increased use of contract labour, the introduction 
of redundancy and the establishment of 
reversionary tenure positions, as well as the 
development of performance indicators 
(Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, 
1986, Chapters 5-6). Moreover, these proposals 
were simply the last in a long line of State or 
management inspired attempts to change 
conditions of employment dating back to the late 
1970s. Others included CTEC's 1978 review of 
study leave, the establishment of the 1981 Inquity 
into Academic Tenure by the Australian Senate 
(during which the AVCC and CTEC supported 
the introduction of retrenchment for tenured 
academics), staff cutbacks following the 1981/82 
bout of forced college mergers and ongoing 
support by CTEC and the AVCC for an increased 
use of junior contract labour (McCulloch, 1985 
and Muffet, 1986, p. 111). 
THE EMERGENCE OF ACADEMIC 
UNIONISM 
Thus at the end of higher education's long boom 
academic staff were besieged by multiple 
pressures, including: 
• Declining material rewards and in particular a 
decline in salaries relative to other unionized 
professionals such as teachers and public 
servants. 
• A new and alien managerial culture. 
• Reduced promotion opportunities and the 
real or perceived threat of redundancy or 
retrenchment arising from financial pressures. 
• Increased competition with colleagues and 
with other universities and colleges for 
students, research opportunities and grants. 
• An increase in the routine character of much 
of academic labour, particularly in teaching 
and administration at undergraduate level. 
• An erosion of discretionary academic labour 
time. 
In short, to coin a Marxist phrase, academics had 
been proletarianized by the emergence of mass 
higher education. The idealist view of academics 
as 'members of unique University communities 
where employer-employee relations existed, but 
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were subservient to the pursuit of the common 
endeavour within those communities' (O'Brien, 
1992, p. 2) was increasingly at odds with the day-
to-day realities of academic life. Academics 
turned to unionism as a vehicle for defending 
their collective interests. 
A Note on US Experience 
The trend towards academic unionism appears to 
have been international in character. From the 
mid 1970s the Canadian Association of University 
Teachers (CAUT) substantially increased its 
authority and involvement in collective 
bargaining, while in the UK the Association of 
University Teachers increasingly sought a central 
negotiating role on salaries, tenure and promotion 
issues, as well as affiliating with the British Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) (National Education 
Association, 1985, Chapter 3). 
The US experienced a huge upsurge in 
unionisation amongst academic staff from the 
mid 1960s through to the early 1980s. The US 
industrial relations system requires union 
bargaining units to be organised at institutional 
level with local unions seeking certification (or 
registration) from appropriate state authorities. 
In the public sector bargaining agents seek legal 
status under distinct legislation established by 
each of the State legislatures. In the private sector 
bargaining units are governed by the National 
Labour Relations Act and bargaining is overseen 
by the National Labor Relations Board, a quasi-
judicial administrative agency with regional 
bureaucracies (Spitzberg, 1984, p. 102). 
Bargaining agents are able to obtain legally 
binding industrial contracts with codify 
employment conditions for a fixed term. 
The magnitude of expansion of academic 
unionism can be gauged from the following table 
which traces the growth in certified academic 
bargaining units in the US higher education 
system. 
Studies in the US reveal that this growth 
coincided with the onset of stagnation in higher 
education and that the tendency towards 
unionism has been stronger at lower levels of the 
hierarchy and is (not surprisingly) inversely 
related to the level of job satisfaction and to the 
level of genuine participatory democracy in the 
academic workplace (Foster, 1976 and National 
Education Association, 1985, pp. 17-30). The 
growth has also been affected by the highly 
competitive nature of academic unionism in the 
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US, and has varied according to the culture and 
status of the colleges and universities within 
which academics work. The largest and most 
explicitly industrial organisation in higher 
education is the American Federation of Teachers 
(AFT) which represents around 43% of unionized 
academics and has extensive links with the 
organised labour movement. The American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP), 
formed in 1916 as a professional body for 
professors, has around 90,000 members and acts 
as a collective bargaining agent, although its 
perspective on industrial unionism remains 
ambivalent. The National Education Association 
(NEA), similar in orientation to the AAUP, also 
plays a role in both the professional and industrial 
arenas. These national bodies do not act as the 
direct collective bargaining agent - this is carried 
out by local faculty or regional organisations 
which are affiliated with one of the AFT, AAUP or 
NEA. Competition between these unions is 
maintained through the requirement that 
academic staff periodically "elect" (via a ballot) a 
local bargaining agent to represent them. These 
"elections", and many industrial disputes, often 
encourage alliances between two of the three 
national organisations in order to secure 
majorities. At the University of Pittsburgh, for 
example, the local bargaining agent is jointly 
affiliated with the AFT and the AAUP (Elam and 
Moskow, 1969; Spitzberg, 1984; Taskunas, 1981; 
and Drescher and Polishook, 1985). 
These unions now represent around 200,000 US 
academic staff (with 80% of unionists being in the 
public sector) and appear to have played a 
significant role in gaining higher minimum salary 
rates for union members than non-union 
members in the public system. Tables 2 and 3 
compare and contrast unionized and non-
unionized salaries in US public higher education 
system by classification and discipline area. The 
figures are quite impressive - across all grades 
unionized salaries are 16.5% higher than salaries 
at non-unionized institutions, and across the key 
discipline areas are between 9% and 25% higher 
(with the notable exception of business and 
management). 
Some caution is required in placing too much 
weight on this data as it excludes consideration of 
the very large US private education sector. Some 
estimates suggest the difference may be little 
more than 5% when private institutions are 
included. Unionization in the private sector has 
declined since a 1980 US Supreme Court Decision 
in the case of Yeshiva University v the NatiOltal 
Labour Relations Board (Supreme Court, 1980). 
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TABLE 1: NUMBER OF TEACHING STAFF BARGAINING UNITS IN US HIGHER EDUCATION 
SYSTEM 
1966 11 1970 160 1974 360 
1967 25 1971 230 1980 427 
1968 65 1972 290 1986 
1969 130 1973 330 
(Taskunas, 1981, p. 154 and National Centre for Study of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education, 
1987) 
TABLE 2: DIFFERENCES IN U.S. SALARIES FOR UNIONIZED AND NON-UNIONIZED 
ACADEMIC STAFF (AVERAGES OF WHOLE U.S. PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION SECTOR 
1989/90) 
UNIONIZED NON-UNIONIZED 
CLASSIFICATION SALARY SALARY DIFFERENCE 
(AVERAGE) (AVERAGE) 
$US $US 
Professor 50,871 45,323 12.2 
Associate 40,996 37,259 10.0 
Professor 
Assistant 33,397 31,294 6.7 
Professor 
New Assistant 30,642 25,137 21.9 
Professor 
Instructor 25,773 24,214 6.4 
ALL RANKS 42,680 46,649 16.5 
(National Education Association, 1991, pp. 17-20) 
TABLE 3: DIFFERENCE IN U.S. ACADEMIC SALARIES FOR UNIONIZED AND NON-
UNIONIZED ACADEMIC STAFF (AVERAGES OR WHOLE U.S. PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION 
SECTOR, DISCIPLINE BY DISCIPLINE, 1989/90) 
UNIONIZED NON-UNIONIZED 
DISCIPLINE SALARY SALARY DIFFERENCE 
(AVERAGE) (AVERAGE) 
$US $US 
Social Sciences 41,614 34,865 19.36 
49,845 45,724 9.01 
43,555 43,481 0.17 
41,793 35,658 17.21 
41,245 32,868 25.49 
46,309 38,778 19.42 
37,545 30,874 21.61 
40,874 33,563 21.51 
45,635 39,910 14.34 
45,183 38,507 17.34 
(National Education Association, 1991, pp. 17-20) 
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The case is worth examining as it says much 
about the relationship between collegial 
governance and academic unionism. At issue 
was an application filed by the Yeshiva University 
Faculty Association (Union) with the National 
Labor Relations Board seeking certification as a 
bargaining agent for full-time academic staff, 
following a vote by the academics to support the 
Union claim. The University opposed the 
application on the grounds that academic staff 
participation in the governance of the University 
gave them a 'managerial' role, and that the 
relevant statute did not allow 'managerial 
employees' union rights. Although the Labor 
Relations Board rejected this argument the 
University won an appeal in the Supreme Court. 
The Court held by a 5-4 margin that: 
... authority in the typical 'mature' private 
university is divided between a central 
administration and one or more collegial bodies. 
This system of shared authority evolved from tile 
medieval model of collegial decision-making in 
which the guilds of scholars were responsible 
only to themselves ... [these] traditions continue 
to play a significant role ... principles developed 
for use in the industrial setting cannot be 
imposed blindly on the academic world... The 
controlling consideration is that the Faculty 
exercise authority at Yeshiva which is 
unquestionably managerial. Their authority in 
academic matters is absolute [including] ... 
teaching methods, grading and ... 011 occasion 
the size of the student body ... the faculty at each 
school make recommendations to the Dean or 
Director in every case of facuIty hiring, tenure, 
sabbaticals, termination and probation 
(Supreme Court, 1980, pp. 857/861). 
For many observers the Court's decision was 
tinged with an air of unreality given the actual 
distribution of authority within modern 
universities. This point was not lost on the 
Court's dissenting minority which, led by Justice 
Brennan said: 
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... the task of operating the university enterprise 
has beell transformed from the faculty to an 
autonomous administration which faces the 
same pressures to cut costs and increase 
efficiencies that confront any large industrial 
organisation. The past decade of budgetary 
cutbacks, declinillg ellrolmellts, reductiolls ill 
further appoilltmellts, curtailment of academic 
programs, alld illcreasillg calls for accoulltability 
to alullmi alld other special illterest groups has 
only added to the erosioll of the faculties' role in 
institutiolls decision-making process. . .. what 
the Court fails to apprehelld is that whatever 
influence the facuIty wields ill univerSity 
decision-making is attributable solely to its 
collective expertise as professional educators, 
and not to ally managerial prerogatives ... the 
administration may attempt to defer to the 
faculty's competence whellever possible, but it 
must and does apply its own distinct perspective 
to those recommendations, a perspective which is 
based Oil fiscal and other managerial policies 
which the faculty has no part in developillg ... 
The very fact that Yeshiva's facuIty has voted for 
the Union indicates that the faculty does not 
perceive its interests to be aligned with those of 
management ... The Court's conclusion that the 
faculty's professional interests are 
indistinguishable from those of the 
administration is bottomed 011 an idealised 
model of collegial decision-making that is a 
vestige of the great medieval university. But the 
university of today bears little resemblance to the 
'community of scholars' of yester-year 
(Supreme Court, 1980, pp. 870/872/873). 
Although Yeshiva has been used by American 
higher education employers to stymie the further 
development of private sector academic unionism 
during the 1980s its precedent value may not 
stand the ultimate test of time. Its application has 
generated some untenable contradictions. The 
US journal Academe reported in 1987 on a major 
dispute between the American Association of 
University Professor (AAUP) and Fairleigh 
Dickinson University. An agreement was 
established in 1984 which, amongst other things, 
guaranteed a faculty role in the appointments of 
Chairs, Deans and committees. As the agreement 
neared expiry the University made application to 
have the AAUP local decertified - using the 
Yeshiva precedent the University argued that the 
faculty were 'managerial' in exercising a formal 
role in appointments. The AAUP local was 
decertified and without formal bargaining power 
the academics lost the legal 'managerial' rights 
upon which the University based its case! 
(McDonald, pp. 20-4). There are some signs that 
Yeshiva is being questioned by lower courts and 
authorities. In 1991 an AFT / AAUP local won a 
major victory in a dispute with the University of 
Pittsburgh about the refusal of the university 
management to bargain over a new industrial 
contract. Management relied on Yeshiva's 
'managerial' formulation but the Pennsylvania 
Labor Relations Board ruled that only a minority 
of faculty were allowed to participate in the 
collegial process, that faculty authority was 
limited to academic matters (not budgets or 
staffing) and that decisions of participatory 
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bodies were recommendatory only (American 
Federation of Teachers, 1991, pp. 8-9). 
Studies appear to indicate that US academic 
unionism has been beneficial for staff. There is no 
doubt that unionized salaries are higher, although 
by how much is not clear. They are clearly 
considerably higher in public sector institutions 
and according to one commentator unionized 
salaries have the effect of pushing non-unionized 
salaries upwards. In the competitive US 
environment 
admillistrators at 1l01l-llIziOllized illstitutions 
(Ileed) to match gains by unionized faculty ill 
order to maintain their institution's 
representation and stave off consideration of 
collective bargailling by their own faculty ... 
given that most unionized faculty are found at 
State supported colleges and ulliversities it may 
be somethillg of a distortioll to draw 
comparisons betweell unionized and non-
Ulliollized colleges since faculty's real 
competitors are often civil servants ... without 
collective bargainingfacuIty salaries would have 
diminished in some proportion as a direct result 
of the increasing power of unionized civil 
servants 
(Drescher and Polishook, 1985, p. 15). 
Decisive gains also appear to have been made in 
increasing faculty participation in decision-
making (a somewhat ironic twist given the Yeshiva 
decision) (National Education Association, 1985, 
pp. 17-30). A typical collective contract will not 
only include salary, leave, retirement and related 
benefits, but will also include provisions 
guaranteeing 'rank-and-file' academic staff 
involvement in selecting Heads of Department 
and in the recruitment, appointment and 
promotion of staff. 
AUSTRALIAN DEVELOPMENTS 
The evolution of Australian academic unionism 
has been conditioned by many of the same factors 
at work in overseas higher education systems but 
has spread more rapidly and has (arguably) 
gained greater authority. This distinction arises 
from the stronger general union culture which 
exists in Australia, and the effects of Australia's 
centralised industrial relations system. In this 
system unions organised at State and Federal 
level have monopoly coverage rights (which are 
difficult to challenge), and awards and industrial 
agreements granted by arbitration tribunals apply 
to all workers employed by the employer parties 
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to the award (whether union members or not). 
Moreover, recalcitrant employers are legally 
obliged to participate in arbitration and to adhere 
to an arbitrated decision. Awards or agreements 
have an unlimited life and can only be varied 
with agreement by both parties. These 
arrangements have placed Australian academic 
unions in a relatively strong legal position 
(although employers retain the whip hand in 
relation to matters defined as 'managerial 
prerogative'). 
It is often wrongly assumed that academic 
unionism in Australia began with the 1987 federal 
registration of the two national academic unions -
the Union of Australian College Academics 
(UACA) and the Federated Australian University 
Staff Association (FAUSA) - in the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC). In fact 
there was extensive development of formal union 
organisation much earlier. 
The pace and depth of this development was 
uneven with (not surprisingly) college academics, 
former teachers and more junior academics 
unionising earlier and in greater numbers than 
their more senior counterparts in the more 
prestigious traditional universities. 
In 1957 the New South Wales Teachers Federation 
(NSWTF) successfully gained a salaries award 
from the NSW Industrial Commission for 
academics employed at the NSW University of 
Technology. Given the absence of any other 
formal regulation of academic salaries by the 
State the industrial award quickly became a 
benchmark for salaries negotiation in other 
universities, even though most academic staff 
were not union members. The Federal Council of 
University Staff Associations of Australia 
(FCUSSA) - a national body formed in 1952 which 
later became FAUSA in 1962 - was unconvinced 
that industrial regulation of salaries was 
appropriate. It retained (with some ambivalence) 
the view that the scholarly labour of academics 
was sui generis and could not be treated as a 
conventional employment relationship. 
Nonetheless from 1957 onwards, no doubt in part 
under pressure from the NSW award, 
FCUSSA/FAUSA was concerned "to achieve a 
nationallllode of salary determination, minimise salary 
differentials while at the same time maintaining the 
collegial traditions of academic life" (O'Brien, 1992, p. 
6 and O'Brien, 1990). The Eggleston Report (1964) 
on academic salaries laid the foundation for the 
development of a national salaries structure. 
While endorsing the concept that academic 
labour was sui generis the Report nonetheless 
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acknowledged that the fixation of salary rates 
must have some regard to rates for comparable 
professional groups, particularly research 
scientists and engineers. 
The establishment and subsequent expansion of 
advanced education from the mid 1960s saw the 
establishment of a new national organisation in 
1968 - the Federation of Staff Associations of 
Australian Colleges of Advanced Education 
(FSAACAE) - to represent the interests of 
academic staff in the burgeoning institutes of 
technology, teachers' colleges, advanced 
education colleges and other specialist vocational 
institutes. The Sweeney Report (1969) provided the 
basis for a national advanced education structure 
(although the authority of State governments over 
the advanced education sector lessened its 
impact) and proclaimed that the new institutions 
were 'equal but different'. Salary rates for 
lecturers and senior lecturers were to be the same 
as those of traditional university staff. 
Further national reviews followed (Eggleston 1970 
and Campbell 1973) until finally a permanent 
national review and adjustment mechanism was 
established in 1974 in the form of the Academic 
Salaries Tribunal (AST). This had been actively 
sought by FAUSA and FSAACAE. The Tribunal 
represented a classic compromise between the 
need to provide for a regular independent 
assessment of salaries, and the perceived need to 
ensure that the special character of academic 
work was not diluted by the processes of 
industrial arbitration. The Tribunal did not 
operate in an adversarial fashion and was 
encumbered in several ways: 
• Its jurisdiction was confined to salary and 
related matters only and it could not become 
involved in matters such as leave, tenure or 
promotion. 
• It did not provide conciliation or dispute 
resolution procedures. 
• Its decisions were recommendations only 
(although it should be noted that most 
institutions adopted its scales as Government 
funding was determined by Tribunal 
decisions). 
• There was no right of appeal from its 
recommendations and Parliament retained 
the right to veto its decisions (a prerogative 
not available to Parliament in the case of 
decisions of the Industrial Relations 
Commission). 
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With the end of higher education's Australian 
long boom in 1975, the weaknesses of the AST 
became apparent. Its jurisdiction was unable to 
deal with the welter of employment and 
professional issues arising from the end of the 
boom. The sharp contraction in advanced 
education left college academics vulnerable to 
unilateral funding and employment decisions by 
Governments and campus administrations. A 
wave of rationalisation washed over the colleges 
between 1976 and 1982. At the same time in the 
traditional university sector the cessation of 
growth saw a rising discontent amidst junior 
academic ranks. As the decade progressed 
academics identified that the 'arms length' 
relationship between the State and Vice 
Chancellors/Principals was disappearing. 
Increasingly, management and the State were 
moving in lock-step to impose bureaucratically 
determined adjustment mechanisms to cope with 
declining resources (see page 8). Thus there was 
a surge of union activity by academics from the 
mid 1970s onwards as academic labour sought to 
establish a countervailing relationship with the 
State via State-sponsored conciliation and 
arbitration. A former prominent Vice-Chancellor, 
Professor Keith Hancock, describes this 
development: 
... before the 1970s the staff assqciations did not 
perceive themselves as 1l1liollS alld, ill deed, 
regarded cOllve/ltional union behaviour as 
inconsistent with the way ill which ulliversities 
were govemed, emphasizing, as it did, 
collegiality and participation. During the 1970s 
and 1980s however, they increasingly identified 
themselves as entities forfurthering the interests 
of staff members ... an important factor was ... 
the influence of more union members of staff, 
often lacking tenure, to whom more customary 
union goals were important ... the process may 
also have been fostered by the develop11lent of 
more managerial attitudes and practices among 
the administrations, this ill turn being 
accentuated by the policies of the federal 
government and its buffer authorities ... the 
associations' becomillg more 111lioll-like with tlte 
Ilecessity of getting recognitioll ill the 
conciliation mzd arbitratioll system 
(Hancock, 1989, p. 114). 
The Move to State Industrial Commissions 
The issue for academics was how to unionise. 
Legal access to the federal tribunal - the AIRC -
was not possible in the mid-1970s. A 1929 High 
Court decision in the State School Teachers case had 
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rUled that teachers (and by extension some other 
categories of professional workers, including 
academics) were not engaged in an 'industry' and 
therefore could not be involved in 'industrial 
disputes'. This restriction did not apply, however, 
in the various State industrial jurisdictions. 
college academics was active in seeking to 
register Statewide unions in these jurisdictions 
and gained awards in Western Australia (1976), 
South Australia (1982-83), Queensland (1982-83) 
and Victoria (1981-85). These awards covered a 
variety of non-salary matters (the State tribunals 
refused to become involved with salaries, given 
the AST's jurisdictions) including leave, tenure 
and regulation of the incidence of contract 
employment. FSAACAE changed its name to the 
Federation of College Academics (FCA) in 1979 
(and later to the Federated Council of Academics 
in 1986) and began to play an important co-
ordinating role as the national collective 
organisation (McCulloch, 1985). 
The move to State tribunals was much slower in 
the traditional university sector reflecting the 
more conservative culture of FAUSA's local 
Branches and the fact that rationalisation was not 
as severe as in advanced education. From the mid 
1970s onwards FAUSA's local Branches moved to 
seek registration in the State tribunals but this 
was more of a defensive move (to prevent other 
unions from covering traditional university 
academics) than a move to regulate conditions of 
employment. While local Branches would accede 
to FAUSA having industrial authority as a salaries 
advocate in the AST they were not supportive of 
industrial regulation of other conditions. 
Pressure from untenured staff saw the first State 
industrial determination registered by a FAUSA 
Branch in 1986 - the Monash University Tutors case. 
Federal Registration . 
The move to State industrial tribunals did not 
diminish the need for academics to gain access to 
the federal AIRC. There were compelling reasons 
as the early 1980s approached to seek national 
registration, including: 
• The continuing weakness of the AST whose 
continued adherence to the doctrine of sui 
ge/leris made it difficult for FCA and FAUSA 
to argue that academic pay rates should keep 
pace with rates for public servants, teachers 
and engineers. The problem was particularly 
acute for the college sector as the AST had 
abandoned the nexus between university and 
college rates in 1976. 
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• The slow pace of expanding State award 
coverage which left college academics 
vulnerable when the second wave of college 
rationalisation commenced in 1982 (the 'Razor 
Gang' amalgamations), and which left the 
untenured staff in the traditional universities 
largely unprotected as per capita funding 
rates continued to decline (McCulloch, 1985, 
pp. 5-7). 
A national approach was needed. The shift 
towards this approach was signalled in 1980 on 
the political front with the affiliation ofFCA to the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), and 
on the legal front with moves in the High Court 
by FAUSA to seek a legal basis for national 
registration as a union. The Darvall case sought, 
unsuccessfully, to argue that universities were 
ancillary to industry and commerce, and that 
therefore the work of academics had an incidental 
'industrial' character, and was therefore capable 
of becoming involved in 'industrial' disputes. 
The narrow nature of the FAUSA argument, and 
the fact that FAUSA declined an invitation from 
the Court to challenge the State School Teachers 
case head-on, underlined that traditional 
university academics at a senior level still 
retained ambivalence about their relationship 
with the State's industrial relations apparatus. 
Although the High Court rejected the narrow 
FAUSA argument it seized the next available 
opportunity to overturn the fundamental basis of 
the State School Teachers case. In the 1983 ASWU 
case it expanded massively the constitutional 
definition of 'industrial disputes' to include: 
... tize popular meaning of 'industrial disputes' 
(wizich) includes disputes between employees 
and employers abou t the terllls and cOlzditions of 
employment and conditions of work 
(McCulloch, 1983, p.1). 
This enabled access to the AIRC for a host of 
previously excluded categories of worker, 
including teachers, social workers and academics. 
FeA and FAUSA both made immediate 
application for registration - in FCA's case under 
the name of the Union of Australian College 
Academics (UACA). It was, however, to be 
another three and a half years before registration 
was achieved, because of further technical and 
legal process. The intervening period was 
characterised by rising militancy amongst 
academics. The election of a Labor Government 
in 1983 raised expectations that the pressures on 
higher education would abate. Developments 
rapidly confounded these expectations. New 
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student places were 'marginally' funded, which 
increased class sizes and workloads, and 
academic staff witnessed the appalling spectacle 
of direct Prime Ministerial intervention in the 
AST. On 17 April 1984, following a 2 year review, 
the Tribunal awarded a 5% academic salary rise. 
On June 5, the Tribunal reconvened, and after 
refusing to allow substantive argument from FCA 
or FAUSA, reversed its earlier decision and 
awarded less than half of its original decision, 
with the balance to flow a year later. Some weeks 
later it became public that the chair of the 
Tribunal, Justice Ludeke, had acted on the advice 
of a private telephone call from the Prime 
Minister. The decision generated work-bans in 
NSW institutions, but was later overturned by the 
Federal Court (Federation of College Academics, 
1984) .. 
In 1985 and 1986 there were sporadic outbreaks of 
protest, including a number of stoppages and 
strikes, about the contract academic labour 
system which saw a Statewide agreement reached 
between CASA (FCA's Victorian Branch) and 
Victorian colleges. The agreement limited non-
tenured appointments to no more than 25% of the 
total academic staff profile. The agreement 
underlined the pressure being generated by the 
academic 'underclass'. The federal registration of 
FAUSA in December 1986 and UACA in February 
1987 was long overdue. 
Federal Awards 
Following federal registration a raft of national 
and local federal industrial awards was 
established rapidly during 1987, 1988 and 1989. 
The first national awards were salaries 
agreements for both the university and college 
sectors. These simply reflected prevailing rates, 
although an important change occurred when 
these awards were amended in 1989. The salary 
rates set down were no longer prescribed as paid 
rates (i.e. the employer was legally unable to pay 
above the set rate) but were rather cast as 
lIlillilllUI1l rates (i.e. the employer must legally pay 
at least the prescribed rate but is free to pay above 
this without the intervention of the AIRC). This 
has provided universities and colleges with 
flexibility to deal with shortages in particular 
disciplines, by offering market salary loadings, 
and to retain senior academic staff. This change 
has been carried over to the new unified salary 
structure established in 1991. Salaries provision 
by federal award has been augmented by a 
further national award - the 1988 Tertiary 
Educatio1l Supera1lnuation Award which provides 
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3% of salary annually as a compulsory employer 
contribution for retirement, in addition to the 14% 
contribution provided by the Superannuation 
Scheme for Australian Universities (SSAU). 
These awards have been jointly established by 
UACA and FAUSA. 
The other main national award to which UACA 
and FAUSA are parties - the 1988 Second Tier 
Award - contains a number of punitive provisions 
which were initiated by the higher education 
employers' association - The Australian Higher 
Education Industrial Association (AHEIA). These 
include clauses which provide for retrenchment 
and redundancy of academic staff, and also 
clauses providing for dismissal on the grounds of 
ill-health, unsatisfactory performan<;e or serious 
misconduct. The award provisions were bitterly 
resisted by UACA and FAUSA - including stop-
work action in most major cities - but were 
eventually imposed by the AIRC following 
arbitration hearings in late 1988. It is consistent 
with the general pattern of the 1970s and 1980s 
that these provisions were jointly sought by the 
State and institutional management. Their 
continuing alliance fatally undermined whatever 
confidence academic staff still had left in collegial 
relationships (particularly in traditional 
universities). This, combined with hostility to 
other aspects of the Dawkins' agenda, helps 
explain the militancy and industrial action which 
accompanied the 1989-91 award restructuring 
dispute. 
UACA actively built up a network of federal 
enterprise awards dealing with conditions of 
employment such as workloads, annual leave, 
long service leave, promotion polic)'t 
appointment procedures and contract 
employment. These awards are Queellsland 
Colleges of Advallced Edllcatioll Award 1988, 
Australian Fillll, Radio and Televisio1l Sc11001 Award 
1988, Nort11el'll Territory University Award 1988, 
Australian Maritime College Award 1988, Soutll 
Australian CAE Award 1989, Tasmania1l State 
Institute of Tecll1lology Award 1989, Victoria1l CAE 
Leave Award 1989, Weste1'1l Australia1l College of 
Adva1lced Educatio1l Award 1989, University of 
Ca1lberra Award 1991. The awards provided legal 
protection of long standing conditions but 
avoided rigidity by reflecting the different 
histories and cultures of each institution. These 
were, in turn, buttressed by over 20 local 
industrial agreements dealing with institutional 
amalgamations which were jointly negotiated by 
UACA and FAUSA in 1989-91. 
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The major achievement of Australian academic 
unionism is undoubtedly the 1991 Award 
Restl'llcturing Agreement - an undertaking of 
immense complexity given that it involved the 
merger, on a national basis, of the salaries and 
traditions of university and colleges. The 
agreement, finalised in July 1991, only came after 
months of wrangling within and between the 
unions, the AHEIA and the Commonwealth, and 
followed two national work stoppages and bans 
on students' annual examination results in 1990 
(Blackford, 1992; Currie, 1992 and McCulloch, 
1991). Finalization of the agreement came at a 
time when the Australi'an academic labour 
market had moved back into a phase of excess 
demand which strengthened the hand of the 
academic unions. A 1990 labour market study 
has estimated that Australia faces a shortage of up 
to 20,000 academic staff based on student growth 
projections to the year 2001 (Sloan et al., 1990). 
Not only did the agreement provide for 
substantial salary hikes it also dealt directly with 
two of the key issues which had underpinned the 
rise of academic unionism - promotion 
opportunities and the incidence of untenured 
employment. 
A Unified Academic Classification Structure 
The dramatic change in the Australian higher 
education system wrought by the W11ite Paper had 
major industrial relations implications. There 
were some 70 or so universities and colleges of 
advanced education in 1987 which through 
mergers and amalgamations had been reduced to 
some 40 or so new institutions by 1991. Almost 
all of these new institutions are universities which 
have been created by either the merger of CAEs 
with 'traditional universities ' (such as the 
amalgamation of Melbourne University with the 
Melbourne CAE) or the simultaneous merger and 
upgrading of former CAEs to form a 'new 
university' (such as the upgrading of the former 
New South Wales Institute of Technology and its 
subsequent merger with Kuringai CAE to form 
the University of Technology, Sydney). The 
abolition of the binary system and the resultant 
Unified National System (UNS) impelled unions 
and employers to re-examine the separate salary 
rates and classification structures for college and 
university academics established by the AST in 
1976, and which were carried over in the Federal 
AIRC in 1987. 
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It was not possible to maintain separate rates and 
classifications for college and university academic 
staff when the structural basis of separation has 
disappeared it would involve huge 
administrative complexity to sustain a former 
college salary stream within amalgamated 
institutions and would undoubtedly lead to 
internal friction and division amongst staff. This 
posed acute questions about th.e nature of 
academic work and the skills and qualifications 
required to perform it. In the UNS two distinct 
but complementary academic cultures had been 
merged - the culture of the former college system 
which entailed a primary emphasis on teaching, 
vocational training and the ongoing development 
of formal links with the professions and industry, 
and the culture of the 'traditional' universities 
which was founded on the link between teaching, 
research and postgraduate education. This 
cultural merger highlighted in its sharpest form 
the 'parity of esteem' debate which dominated 
Australian higher education planning from the 
early 1980s onwards. 
Although the unions and the employers 
acknowledged early in the award restructuring 
negotiations that a new classification and salary 
structure should be based on full equality 
between the two former sectors, giving effect to 
comparable worth was not easy. The autonomy 
of individual academic staff and the wide variety 
of institutional practices in the former binary 
system provided few national points of reference 
upon which to rely in designing a new structure. 
Many academic staff had never worked in 
accordance with defined duty statements; 
classification criteria for particular categories of 
academic staff had rarely been systematically 
committed to paper, and where they had been 
there were often substantial variations within and 
between institutions. The unified structure 
produced for the first time broad standards which 
can be applied across the whole higher education 
system. These standards ensure that teaching, 
research, administration and professional 
contributions are primary tasks for all academic 
staff. The key to relative seniority within the 
academic structure lies not so much in the balance 
of these functions as in the intensity and 
excellence with which they are performed. 
Flowing from this teaching, research and 
professional/ consulting contributions should 
have broadly equal value. None is more 
important than another and none can be 
performed well without reference to the others. 
Based on these principles the academic award 
restructuring agreement established a 
67 
Australiall Journal of Teacher Educatioll 
broadbanded five level salary and classific::: tion 
structure to replace the previous college and 
university arrangements as follows: 
.. Level A: former University Tutor and 
Senior Tutors and former College Lecturer III 
.. Level B: former University Lecturers 
and College Lecturers II and I 
.. Level C: former University Senior 
Lecturers and College Senior Lecturers rr and I 
.. Level D: former University Associate 
Professor and College Principal Lecturer 
.. Level E: former University Professors 
and College Heads of School 
To encourage diversity and flexibility the 
agreement left the issue of titles and designations 
to institutional processes, but provided broad 
classification criteria for appointment and 
promotion to each level. 
Unifying and Improving Promotion 
Opportunities 
In the binary system two distinct approaches to 
promotion existed. The 'traditional' universities 
had an understandable emphasis on the centrality 
of research and publications as the basis for 
achieving promotion, particularly at Senior 
Lecturer level and above. Such an emphasis arose 
from the high level of postgraduate effort in these 
institutions and the consequent need for 
academic staff to have the requisite research 
experience necessary for postgraduate 
supervision. Teaching and professional 
experience had formal equivalent standing as 
promotion criteria but a premium was placed on 
research. The CAE sector also gave considerable 
weight to research and publications in assessing 
promotion applications but gave real effect to the 
formal equivalence in value of teaching and 
professional contributions as promotion criteria. 
The challenge in award restructuring was to 
ensure that both approaches to promotion were 
kept in balance. To deny in practice the centrality 
of teaching and professional experience in 
promotion would not only disenfranchise a large 
body of former CAE staff but also undermine the 
twin objectives of improving the quality of 
undergraduate teaching and encouraging the 
mobility of staff between institutions and the 
professions. On the other hand, to deny the 
importance of research and publications would 
diminish the international standing of the 
Australian higher education system and 
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discourage active postgraduate research at a thne 
when higher degree enrolments were Critically 
low. The award restructuring agreement 
addressed this problem by establishing a common 
set of national guidelines to be used in 
determining promotion through the proposed 
unified national salary structure. The agreement 
suggests that the following criteria should be 
applied to promotion applications in broadly 
equal measure: 
.. Experience and achievement in teaching and 
curriculum development. 
.. Achievement and experience in research and 
scholarship. 
.. Contribution to institutional planning and 
governance. 
.. Contribution to relevant professions and the 
wider community, including industry 
exchanges and consulting work. 
.. Formal qualifications or progress towards 
such qualifications. 
Given the wide diversity of existing promotion 
arrangements and the fact that individual 
institutions have different missions within the 
UNS the agreement did not seek to prescribe 
these criteria but instead required institutions to 
evolve new promotion arrangements. The 
evolution of new approaches is to be monitored 
by the unions and the employers leading to a 
review of promotion of a system-wide and 
institutional basis at the end of 1993. 
The second (and arguably more important) 
dimension of the promotion issue was the extent 
in any event of promotion opportunities. The 
'traditional' university culture had not regarded 
appointments at tutor and senior tutor level as 
career appointments, preferring to see these staff 
(who carry a substantial undergraduate teaching 
load) as academic 'apprentices'. Consequently, 
very few institutions had provisions for internal 
promotion from the tutoring grades to the 
lecturing grades. The agreement represented a 
major breakthrough in this respect by explicitly 
acknowledging that all institutions were required 
to evolve promotion processes which provide for 
internal promotion from Level A to Level B, Level 
B to Level C and .Level C to Level D. This 
evolution will also be monitored by the unions 
and the employers and will be encompassed by 
the proposed 1993 review. 
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Controlling Untenured Employment 
The combination of no-growth in the late 1970s 
and inadequately funded growth in the 1980s 
created an increasingly large pool of untenured 
employment and this long-running sore was 
addressed head-on by the award restructuring 
agreement. The agreement required that a 
system-wide proportion of total academic staff 
(measured on an EFT basis including casual 
appointments) at Level A in tenured employment 
be established at around 30%, and that no more 
than 30% of the total academic staff establishment 
at a system wide level (including casual staff) 
should be in untenured employment. Although 
considerable technical work is still required to 
refine this framework the targets set out are to be 
achieved by 1993 and will yield substantial 
benefits for staff and the system as a whole. 
Combined with improved promotion 
opportunities the incentives for academics 
(particularly young female academics) to remain 
in higher education will be dramatically 
increased. Many institutions will be required to 
convert casual positions into fixed-term positions, 
and in turn a significant number of junior fixed-
term positions should become tenured. 
Halting the Salary Decline 
Restructuring of the academic salary awards 
commenced in mid 1989 and has involved four 
distinct salary movements. A 3% increase in 
salaries was applied to the old college and 
university rates in September 1989 and again in 
May 1990. In July 1991 all Australian academics 
moved to the unified national salary structure, 
but translation to the new scale occurred in two 
steps. The first involved an average salary rise of 
around 8% in 1991 which is to be followed by a 
further average rise of around 1 % in July 1992 
when the second step of the translation process 
occurred. 
These are very large salary rises compared to 
general movements in Australian wages and 
salaries which have risen by only around 9% 
between 1989 and early 1992. Moreover, the new 
structure provides for annual incremental 
progression and has extended the available range 
for future progression. As a consequence the real 
value of the salary increase will continue to grow 
throughout the 1990s, as can be seen from Table 4. 
In reading Table 4 two points should be borne in 
mind - the data do not include the two 3% salary 
rises of September 1989 and May 1990, nor does 
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the table take account of the general 2.5% wage 
rise which flowed to most Australian workers in 
late 1991 - academic staff received this rise in 
September 1991. When these factors are taken 
into account Australian academic salaries have 
risen by around 18% between 1989 and the 
beginning of 1992, which will rise to about 21 % in 
1997 (assuming constant dollars). This has 
occurred at a time when the Australian inflation 
rate has declined sharply, and is now amongst the 
lowest in the developed world. 
Much attention was focussed on the lack of 
international competitiveness of Australian 
academic salaries during the award restructuring 
process with Marginson's study (1989) suggesting 
that Australian salaries had declined by around 
20% relative to salaries in the UK, NZ and the 
USA between the late 70s and late 80s. The award 
restructuring process appears to have achieved a 
major turn-round in the relative competitiveness 
of Australian salaries. Table 5 sets out 
comparisons between Australian and US salaries 
between July 1989 and September 1991 and 
indicates that Australian academics have 
improved their position by around 12% relative to 
their US counterparts since 1989. The 
improvement at the higher levels has been less 
marked (around 9-10%) reflecting the 
compression of relativities in the Australian 
unified salary structure. This was quite justifiable 
given the extensive incidence of allowances and 
overaward payments for staff in the professional 
salary grades. 
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TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF REAL VALUE OF AWARD RESTRUCTURING TABLE 5: COMPARISON OF US AND AUSTRALIAN ACADEMIC SALARIES 1989-1991 
SALARY INCREASES 
(The salary increases have been adjusted to reflect losses, gains and delays in incremental progression 
and are in constant July 1991 dollars, but exclude the 3% rises granted in September 1989 and May 1990.) us INSTITUTION 1991 AUSTRALIAN AUSTRALIAN 
AND 1989 1991 1989 AUSTRALIAN ACADEMIC SALARY SALARY AS % 
TRANSLATION TRANSLATION FINAL OUTCOME CLASSIFICATION SALARY IN IN UNIFIED OFUS 
RISE 1 RISE 2 (23/7/97) TYPE SALARY SALARY UNIVERSITIES AND NATIONAL SYSTEM (23/7/91) (23/7/92) ($A) (a) ($A) CAEs(b) (c) 1989 1991 
Position on Constant value of Constant value of Constant value of 
Old Scale rise in rise inrise in ALL PUBLIC AND (%) ($) (%) ($) (%) ($) PRIVATE 
Professor 66,925 70,263 Professor 63,919 LevelE 73,800 96.0 105.0 
(No increments) 6.2 4188 12.1 8182 12.1 8182 Senior Lecturer 
Associate Professor 49,488 52,225 (max) 48,086 Level C(max) 56,375 97.0 107.9 
Ass. Professor Senior Lecturer 
(No increments) 9.6 5507 13.1 7507 13.1 7507 Assistant Professor 41,213 43,300 (min) 41,460 Level C(min) 48,688 101.0 112.4 
Lecturer 
Senior Lecturer 34,725 37,413 (min) 31,259 Level B(min) 39,463 91.0 106.0 
(Top of Scale, Senior Tutor 
Jan 1) 6.3 3103 7.8 3985 10.8 5485 31,113 32,613 (mid) 28,640 Level A(mid) 33,620 92.0 103.1 
Senior Lecturer 
(Top of Scale, 
July 1) 7.4 3808 7.8 3985 10.8 5485 
95.0 74,900 78,638 Professor 63,919 LevelE 73,800 85.0 
Lecturer Senior Lecturer 
(Top of Scale, Associate Professor 55,538 56,088 (max) 48,086 Level C(max) 56,375 87.0 100.0 
Jan 1) 5.1 2119 6.7 2904 10.2 4404 Senior Lecturer 
Assistant Professor 45,138 47,275 (min) 41,460 Level C(min) 48,688 92.0 103.0 
Lecturer Lecturer 
(Top of Scale, 36,388 39,763 (min) 31,259 Level B(min) 39,463 86.0 99.0 
July 1) 6.8 2823 6.7 2904 10.2 4404 Senior Tutor 
32,138 33,550 (mid) 28,640 Level A(mid) 33,620 89.0 100.2 
Lecturer 
(Bottom of Scale, COMPREHENSIVE 
Jan 1) 13.8 4560 12.9 4657 10.2 4404 INSTITUTIONS 
Tutor 62,138 65,225 Head of Schoo163,919 LevelE 73,800 102.1 113.1 
(Top of Scale, Principal Lecturer 
Jan 1) 2.9 788 5.7 1604 35.7 10004 Associate Professor 49,066 51,736 (min) 50,228 Level D(min) 60,475 102.4 117.0 
Senior Lecturer 
Average of Whole Assistant Professor 40,800 42,700 (min) 41,460 Level C(max) 48,688 101.7 114.0 
Structure Lecturer I 
8.1 $88.94M 9.1 15.7 $127M 32,863 33,650 (min) 31,259 Level B(min) 39,463 95.0 117.3 
Lecturer HI (Federated Council of Academics, 1991, p. 5) 31,563 32,475 (min) 27,138 LeveIA(S2) 30,340 86.0 93.0 
(American data from National Education Association Almanacs of Higher Education). 
US salaries in Australian dollars have been calculated using $A=0.75 $US 
Australian salary as at July 1989 
Australian salary as at September 1991 
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Some caution should be exercised in interpreting 
the table. The classification levels of American 
and Australian academics are not directly 
comparable, and the US salary figures do not 
include stipends, merit loadings and payment for 
summer semester work. These factors are to 
s?me extent offset given that the Australian salary 
figures exclude market loadings, responsibility 
allowances and payments for professional 
consulting work and do not include the second 
award restructuring rise due in July 1992. 
Marginson's study relied on comparisons only 
with US doctoral institutions (where salaries are 
higher than average) and (arguably) Table 5 gives 
a more accurate picture by encompassing all 
public and private US institutions, including 
comprehensive universities. 
A SHORT REPLY TO TWO CRITICS 
The preceding analysis demonstrates that 
academic unionism in Australia has provided 






A significant increase in salaries following 
award restructuring, and additional 
superannuation provision. 
A national framework for negotiating 
improved promotion and tenure 
opportunities at local level, and a new 
amalgamated career structure. 
Implementation of the structure remains a 
matter for local negotiation. 
The creation of an independent link with the 
State apparatus which acts as a counterweight 
to the direct and indirect managerial links 
Vice-Chancellors had already developed with 
the State during the earlier periods of growth 
and contraction. 
The establishment of legally binding but 
diverse agreements at local or Statewide level 
guaranteeing minimum standards of annual 
leave, sick leave, appointment procedures, 
maximum workload ceilings, appeals 
processes and the like. 
It is against this background that the radical 
deregulatory proposals of Professor David 
Penington and Dr David Kemp need to be 
assessed (Pennington, 1991a, 1991b; Kemp, 1991). 
They have developed a model which draws on 
the New Zealand Employment Contracts Act and 
the deregulatory changes to the role of the New 
South Wales Industrial Commission. The legal 
monopoly on coverage of academics by unions 
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would be removed and academics would choose 
whether to be represented by a union - in which 
case award regulation would apply - or whether 
to negotiate a voluntary individual or collective 
contract. These contracts could 
conditions of employment above s set by 
union-sponsored industrial awards or conditions 
set below award standards. 
On its face the proposal seems a reasonable 
attempt to provide individual choice 
flexibility in employment conditions but closer 
examination reveals that the real intention of such 
changes is to fragment academic . 
power and to ensure that future 
conditions are dictated by market and U''''''''/,;l::'la! 
priorities. The main arguments put by 
and Professor Penington to justify 
individual contracts, are first, that the cell 
industrial relatiolls system supports ever il1f'IW'ci.", 
rigidity alld natiollalunijormity, and '''''~v<'u. 
the industrial relatiolls system has eroded (;UlleS!lallt1l 
ill staff relatiolls. 
These arguments ignore the realities of the 
award structures. So-called 'national uniformity' 
has diminished considerably since academics 
gained access to the Federal AIRC. Salary rates 
for academics are now minimulll rates, not paid 
rates which gives employers the legal right to 
negotiate, on an individual basis, extra payments 
for academic staff (see page 66). It is therefore 
quite clear that the purpose of providing a 
'voluntary' system of individual contracts as a 
substitute for award salaries is designed to enable 
employers to pay below the current award rates. 
The intention is to enable individual institutions 
the freedom to internally reallocate State funding 
for salaries according to fluctuations in supply 
and demand. 
Moreover, it is simply nonsense to suggest that 
awards dealing with other conditions of 
employment have imposed 'rigid uniformity'. As 
is set out on page 66-7 these awards are highly 
variable and reflect the different histories and 
practices of particular states or institutions. The 
only other major award with national uniform 
application is the Second Tier Award which is 
punitive in character. This was imposed centrally 
on academic staff by the AHEIA, an organisation 
which has previously been led by Professor 
Penington. Apparently 'uniformity' is 
appropriate if it serves a managerial purpose but 
not if it serves a union purpose. 
The earlier sections of this paper underline that 
the decline of collegiality pre-dates the emergence 
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f academic unionism. Moreover, a closer look at 
~rofessor Penington's definition of collegiality 
.t1",~.,,,,,,,,,,, that his version of it is simply an 
'. [abOl'ate assertion of 11Iallagerial prerogative. He 
e that collegial processes involve senior 
. cademics (Deans, Heads of Department) 
a 'pating in decision-making on behalf of 
Faculty or Departmental staff. This 
conveniently ignores the fact that Deans and 
Heads are increasingly appointed by central 
administration (not by faculty processe~), and 
constitute less than 10% of the academiC staff 
establishment in most institutions. The 
of budgeting to a Faculty and 
departmental level has increased the managerial 
role of Deans and Heads and has actually 
strengthened central management authority. 
Deans and Heads when directly administering 
large pools of funds must be more accountable to 
the central management. 
Developments in New Zealand indicate that the 
Penington/Kemp approach will penalise less 
organised sections of the academic labour for~e, 
erode minimum rates of pay, impact more heaVily 
on junior academics and increase managerial 
authority (Street, 1991). Ironically, it would also 
further erode the Idea of the University by 
differentiating salaries and conditions according 
to market signals (particularly if allied to 
vouchers or market-based fees as principal 
sources of funding) which would value classics, 
philosophy, literature and the liberal arts less 
highly than more marketable vocational or 
professional disciplines. 
Today we are moving towards a more 
decentralised industrial relations system. UACA, 
FAUSA and NSW Teachers Federation now 
represent around 65% of Australian academics 
(approximately 18,000 members) and are well 
placed to respond to a decentralised environment. 
The unions are strong, have wide membership 
support and a commitment to flexible negotiation 
but vigorous industrial tactics. Managers of 
institutions should understand that there is a 
difference between decentralisatioll (which retains 
the central role of unions as negotiating 
instruments at local, State and national level) and 
deregulation which will undermine unionism and 
erode standards. Embracing the Kemp/ 
Penington philosophy will lead to confrontation 
in the academic workplace. But for institutions 
which recognise the role and substantial 
achievements of academic unions, the 1990s will 
provide an opportunity to negotiate more flexible 
and rewarding working conditions on campus. 
The raft of local enterprise awards negotiated by 
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the academic unions in the late 1980s gives lie to 
any suggestion that academic unions are 
incapable of an enterprise focus. 
But the unions insist that future agreements 
complement, rather than destroy, the minimum 
award standards UACA and FAUSA have so 
painstakingly built up. 
ENDNOTE 
1. In this paper the term State is used to denote 
either all forms of Government authority 
and structure or the regional level of 
Government in the Australian federal 
system, depending on the contents. 
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